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The search for universal principles of human resource
management has been a long one marked by periodic
rediscoveries. Indeed one of the paradoxes in this search is that
we keep finding answers but somehow do not stick to them. For
example, the principle that "if you want people to change, you will
be more likely to succeed if you involve them in the process of
planning the change" is as old as management inquiry itself, yet we
find participatory management, Likert's System 4, employee
empowerment, and similar concepts emerging over and over again
as if they are new and brilliant insights. Similarly, the principle
that "if you want good communication in an organization it is
necessary to build high levels of mutual trust," has been known for
a long time, yet we casually introduce management practices that
undermine trust and then wonder later why our organizations are
not more effective.
Most management theories espouse that people are
important, but few of them treat people as more than a resouce to
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be managed like any other resource, and few of them treat people
as a capital investment. In fact the frenzy of downsizing that we are
seeing all over the world today suggests that people are viewed
primarily as a cost to be controlled and minimized. Part of the
problem is that we have split off human resource management from
the general management problem, as if there were some other kind
of management other than human resource management. As long
as organizations are based upon the coordinated action of two or
more people, management is by definition human resource
management.
It is a reasonable to postulate that those few organizations in
the world who understand the above points, who understand that
all management involves people, and who practice the principles of
empowerment and trust building will consistently outperform those
who do not, and that this result will occur in organizations all over
the world regardless of culture. However, this result will only show
up empirically in studies that are carried out over a long period of
time.
Unfortunately most organizational research is not longitudinal
so we try to infer the validity of these principles from sets of
organizations that are only studied at one point in time. And, as
you know, those studies are often embarrassed by the fact that the
very organizations named as the high performers at the time of the
research turn out to be poor performers a few years later.
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There are a few research studies, however, that have taken a
longer range view and have tried to identify organizations that have
been effective over a long period of time and, by comparing them to
less effective organizations, have attempted to distill some
principles that might qualify as candidates for universals. Most of
this research has been done in U.S. or at least western companies
so the extrapolation to Asian companies remains an issue, but at
least we can make a start.
I will review the results of three major studies and then add
my own case material to sharpen the points. In their study
"Decision Making at the Top" (1983) Donaldson and Lorsch
reported.that the executives of companies that are successful for a
long period of time tend to operate from strong belief systems, and
that a major component of those systems is the belief that one must
be responsive to all one's stakeholders--owners, customers,
suppliers, employees, and the community at large. In developing
their own agenda, these executives recognize that any stakeholder
can "put them out of business" so to speak, therefore one cannot
really commit totally to customers any more than one can commit
totally to stockholders or to employees.
Kotter and Heskett in "Corporate Culture and Performance"
(1992).also found that companies that have made major cultural
changes during their histories have in common a core set of beliefs
and values. They note that the core values of such "adaptive
cultures" are 1) a deep concern about customers, stockholders, and
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employees, 2) a strong valuing of people, and 3) a valuing of
processes that can produce change. Products, markets, ways of
working, and organizational structures changed in these
organizations, but the core values did not.
Collins and Porras in their monumental study "Built to Last"
(1994) found that.visionary companies that have survived and
grown successfully for a very long time cared less about particular
customers, products or markets and cared more about building the
organization itself. The founders of these companies wanted to
create organizations that could adapt to changing circumstances
and that necessarily required a genuine concern for people. These
companies shared with the ones studied by others a real
commitment to learning, change, and creative adaptation.
How do these results shape up in the three cases that I know
very well--an old and very successful Swiss-German Chemical and
Pharmaceutical Company, a U.S. computer manufacturer whose
success has levelled off in recent years, and the Economic
Development Board of Singapore? Will we find universals across
these organizations even though they grew up in difference
cultures?
Each of these organizations have what I called a cultural
paradigm, a set of shared assumptions that are coordinated with
each other and, in combination, form the basic shared mental
model of the key members of the organization. I will not review all
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the elements of the model but will focus on those which had an
impact on human resource practices.
If we look at the Swiss-German company (Chart 1), the key
assumption that drove their human resource practices during a
major turnaround in the 80's was the paternalistic sense of being
one family and the implied sense of obligation of the parents to the
children, of management to the employees. Several divisions,
including the main headquarters unit had to undergo severe
downsizing which appeared to violate the core assumption about
family. Yet the company maintained this assumption by insuring
that every manager and employee who was declared redundant
would be eased out of the organization in the most generous and
humane way possible. The length of time before one had to
exercise early retirement was stretched as much as possible. In
the case of some senior managers, they were kept on for several
years beyond where their service was needed. Each person was
individually counseled by his or her supervisor on why their job
was being eliminated. Each person was counseled by a financial
adviser and given opportunities for outplacement counseling.
Many managers were given opportunities to continue in part-time
roles or were re-hired for a time as consultants.
In other words, as the business environment forced changes
in products and markets the structure and functioning of the
organization had to change, but the core assumptions about the
importance of people and the need of the organization to be
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humanely responsible for its people did not change. Instead, they
invented a whole set of outplacement practices that preserved the
basic assumption and measured their success by the fact that
people understood and accepted their outplacement.
The U.S. computer company presents a somewhat different
picture (Chart 2). What basically drove this company was a strong
sense of individualism because truth and successful
implementation could only be accomplished by every person
feeling totally responsible and thinking for him or herself. As this
company grew, they functioned like a family because the managers
and employees knew and liked each other. The model of battling it
out and thinking for themselves worked because they felt like a
family doing things together.
As the company grew and became more successful one could
see that the balance of individualism and family feeling gradually
weakened because of the sheer size of the organization. As
people no longer knew each other personally, it became harder to
sustain trusting debates in a search for truth. Often one was
debating or negotiating with a stranger. As competitive pressures
increased, the organization was stretched and people began to
make commitments to each other that they could not sustain,
increasing the level of mistrust and the building of local empires.
The organization had no effective way of disciplining itself or
cutting off projects and, therefore, grew too large and costly.
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Eventually the decline in profitability led to a series of
massive lay-offs which destroyed even the morale of the survivors.
An almost 100 percent turnover in senior management brought with
it a new set of assumptions which are gradually reshaping the
nature of this organization and have started a new culture building
process. If there is a lesson to be learned from this story it is that
this company's concern for people was too unidimensional--
everyone was given freedom and expected to use it responsibly
and for the good of the organization. This worked during the
building process when people knew and cared about each other.
But there were insufficient mechanisms in place to discipline those
who took advantage of the situation, and there never developed a
sense of responsibility to the larger community as the organization
grew large and more diffuse. The individualistic assumption of
doing the right thing could be modulated in the local units and
projects, but the political fights between units could not be
managed in such a way that the organization as a whole would
benefit. In a certain sense this company was a victim of its own
success.
If one extrapolates from the two cases analyzed thus far, one
could argue that an effective human resource or management
policy would be one that appropriately balances the needs of the
individual and the organization. Organizations thrive on strong
individualism and creativity, the philosophy often embodied in the
concept of empowering people. But as organizations grow and
differentiate themselves into sub-cultures and different
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communities, mechanisms need to be in place to insure that a
sense of responsibility to the total organization is maintained and
that a violation of that sense of responsibility can be identified and
dealt with. Along with empowerment must come adequate systems
of coordination and an acceptance of the assumption that the
empowered individual must exercise his or her freedom on behalf
of the organization as a whole.
Such a balance was achieved in the Swiss-German company
where loyalty to the firm as a whole was historically strongly
embedded while individual contribution was respected and
honored.
The general literature on culture tends to stereotype western
cultures as more individualistic and Asian cultures as more
groupist or communitarian. My third case, the Economic
Development Board of Singapore, represents an interesting case,
from this point of view, because it is to some degree an east-west
hybrid (Chart 3). The five shared basic assumptions are, in this
case, depicted as a star to indicate that they were of equal
importance in the paradigm.
The labels for the core assumptions of the EDB try to reflect
what I would call a balance or integration of the individualistic and
the groupist assumption, though the context within which the EDB
works is certainly an Asian one in which sense of responsibility to
the group is, from the outset, more deeply taken for granted. When
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one encounters such a culture in which individualism and groupism
appear to be more balanced, one must examine the managerial
practices that make this possible. This goes beyond human
resource practices into the structure and core processes of the
organization itself.
For example, to be genuinely committed to teamwork, while,
at the same time being individualistically competitive in climbing
the career ladder requires that the organization have a powerful
and clear mission, commitment to which supercedes individualistic
careerism. One of the problems of the U.S. computer company was
a diffusion and decentralization of mission which permitted local
empires to become competitive with each other. In the case of the
EDB, the commitment to Singapore's economic growth and welfare
was at all times such an overriding issue that there was never any
question about the individual putting him or herself ahead of that
mission.
At the same time, for this system to work requires a rather
unique managerial style and set of attitudes toward authority and
power. To be specific, what one sees in the EDB is a strong
hierarchy and a clear sense of subordination once decisions are
made, but a disregard of hierarchical status during the process of
generating ideas and solving problems. Managers have to know
how not to misuse their position of potential power by exercising
that power only when necessary and when it is completely clear
why they are doing so. In other words, the power and authority
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must be derived from task requirements, logic and ability, not
merely from position.
A third critical component is the notion of free flow of relevant
information inside the organization. Members of the EDB maintain
a delicate balance between the needs to maintain face and avoid
potentially destructive criticism, on the one hand, and the need to
fully communicate task relevant information and performance
related judgements across hierarchical boundaries, on the other
hand. Such communication must be especially strong laterally
among the interdependent units of the organization, and one finds
in the EDB a strong sense that being a team player is to a large
degree defined by communication openness and not using
information for personal power aggrandizement.
In this arena I would suspect that it is not easy to define
human resource practices in an explicit way. It is my impression
that new members of the organization and newly promoted
supervisors and managers must learn on the job, so to speak, how
to maintain this balance. One thing is clear--western admonitions
that one should always give explicit face-to-face performance
feedback are not only difficult to implement in western
organizations, but would be quite inappropriate in most Asian
organizations.
The commitment to partnering with the investing companies
reflects, on the one hand, an economic policy to build long-range
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relations that will insure Singapore's safety and stability, and, on
the other hand, a managerial policy that building up trusting
relationships with one's clients is the best guarantee of a sense of
partnership and mutual benefit.
The final point on the star reflects a more specific human
resource policy--the commitment to a cosmopolitan technocracy by
recruiting primarily overseas trained engineers for the front line
jobs. This policy derived from Singapore's situation in the 1960's
and the decision to link its long range future to high technology, but
such a policy would act more as a constraint on future
transformation and would not qualify as a cultural universal. On
the other hand, to determine what kinds of people will be needed
by an organization to fulfill its mission and the explicit recruitment,
training and development of such people can probably be
considered a universal requirement.
What then can we conclude from the literature and the case
studies? Three major conclusions seem warranted. First, across
all cultures the organizations that manage to remain successful
over long periods of time fundamentally value people, and people
includes stockholders, customers, and employees. The details of
the human resource practices they pursue are probably not as
important as the basic assumption that people make the difference.
They cannot be treated as an expendable resource or a cost factor.
They are intrinsic to the functioning of the organization and have to
be viewed equivalently to other capital investments.
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Second, across all cultures the organizations that value
change and learning are the ones that are more successful in
managing major transformations. Again, how this core assumption
plays out in human resource policies will vary from organization to
organization and may take different shapes in different cultures, but
the organization must be committed to the idea that change,
learning, and transformation is fundamentally a necessary and
desirable process, not something to be avoided.
Third, across all cultures the organizations that manage to
balance individualism with groupism appear to be the most
successful in managing major transformations. It is in this arena
that human resource policies need to be assessed carefully so that
they do not unwittingly undermine the balance by putting either too
much emphasis on teamwork and teambuilding or too much
emphasis on individual competition for promotions. How this
delicate balance is worked out will differ in different cultures, but
the need for some kind of balance can be assumed to be a cultural
universal.
Additional cultural assumptions that aid transformation but
have only indirect impacts on human resource policies would be 1)
the valuing of diversity at the individual or group level so that
creativity potential remains high in the organization; 2) having
enough slack in the organization to allow time for learning and
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transformation; and, 3) having the capacity to think systemically
and to deal with complexity.
In conclusion, it would appear that certain basic cultural
themes are universal, but only at a fairly general level. The actual
managerial practices that will reflect those universals will vary as a
function of the country or industry in which a given organization
finds itself. Most of the universals involve a balancing of opposing
poles, between individualism and groupism, between
communication openness and tactful concern, between exercising
power and empowering others, and, most importantly, between
longer range strategy, values, and principles, on the one hand, and
practical day to day pragmatic problem solving, on the other hand.
My study of the EDB led me to title its culture as one of
"Strategic Pragmatism" and I have found that this concept can be a
model for other organizations that face the necessity for radical
transformation as they attempt to function in an ever more complex
world.
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